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The Problem of Dual Loyalty
ILAN ZVI BARON Durham University
Introduction
In this paper I examine the concept of “dual loyalty.” Dual loyalty arises
when a citizen, permanent resident or group holds competing or con-
flicting political allegiances between states. Dual loyalty is an odd con-
cept since as a descriptive term it says little that is not obvious, that
people can have more than one political loyalty or commitment. Yet the
concept carries a specific tone that questions the justifiability of a plu-
rality of political loyalties, primarily when they are somehow tied to
one’s relationship to the state. As such, the concept suggests that this
normal condition is somehow inherently questionable or problematic,
and the term is often used to describe the potential threat posed by
diasporic or migrant communities. Indeed, citizenship or permanent res-
idency presumes an obligation of loyalty to the state, and anything that
could weaken or challenge this undivided loyalty, such as foreignness
due to one’s migrant or diasporic status, can pose a variety of norma-
tive, theoretical and empirical problems to this presumption. More gen-
erally, the underlying experience of holding competing and potentially
contradictory loyalties is an experience many people have in their per-
sonal and professional lives and has a history that goes beyond the mod-
ern invention of the citizen. Any person or group could face competing
loyalties that will cross class, religious, ethnic, familial, political and
gender lines. Thus, dual loyalty can be used to refer to the common
emotional experience of being pulled in different directions, to the polit-
ical challenges of choosing an overriding commitment and0or to the reli-
gious distinction between the profane and the spiritual. The Christian
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injunction of “rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God
what is God’s” is an early indication of the variations of the dual loy-
alty problem.
However, as a modern political problem dual loyalty is not about
the body0soul division but about potential challenges to state authority
and it is this aspect that I am primarily concerned with exploring. Con-
sequently, it is unsurprising that security discourses are usually involved
when the accusation of dual loyalty is raised, and I argue, following recent
work on security ~Buzan et al.,1998!, that the security issues at stake are
primarily about national identity and values.
Dual loyalty often refers to many discourses at the same time, and
for this, if no other reason, it is important to explore the implications
and uses of this term. Consequently, I will attempt to clarify the con-
cept of dual loyalty. This particular intellectual exercise is important for
at least two reasons. First, dual loyalty is a concept that emerges in a
variety of literatures, including those dealing with diasporas, multicul-
turalism, migration, political obligation and foreign policy. The issue of
dual loyalty relates to both domestic and international politics. The term
can suggest conceptual clarification or function as a political accusa-
tion. Adding clarity to this term would help bring additional insight to
debates that take place in the literature where the term or concept finds
currency. Second, the concept of dual loyalty is itself significant since
it directly relates to the political foundations of the modern state and
citizenship, and to the way in which identity is often understood to func-
tion both inside and between states. As such, this exploration may bring
insight into the normative assumptions that exist in relevant identity
politics.
There are a variety of historical examples of dual loyalty. Dis-
courses of dual loyalty can be found during the English Reformation
and featured in the trial and death of Thomas More. In this paper, I
take examples from across time and space, including those of the Jew-
ish historical experience and that of contemporary Muslim minority
communities. I made this selection because, first, there is significant
recognition that the Jewish diaspora experience has almost archetypal
characteristics ~Cohen, 1997! and thus is a good example to use. Sec-
ond, the example of post-9011 conditions faced by Muslim minorities
provides a particularly relevant and contemporary illustration of the issues
I am addressing. Furthermore, I want to place side by side the experi-
ence of two minority groups who tend to view each other with suspi-
cion due to the politics of the Middle East but may have similar
experiences as minority populations in the West. However, before I
address in more detail the issue of dual loyalty I want to first contextu-
alize the problem of loyalty in relation to its related concept of political
obligation.
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Loyalty and Obligation
The problem of political obligation is a sufficiently important and vague
issue to have garnered derision and significant attention over the years.
Generally speaking, political obligation is about the authority of the state,
of the nature of law, of why anybody would obey the authority of the
state and abide by the law.1 Political obligation, consequently, pertains to
theories of state and legal philosophy. Political obligation is also about
the subject being obliged, and as such is closely related to moral philos-
ophy as well. In contrast to obligation, with its politico-legal referents,
loyalty could refer to acts that emerge out of a set of pre-determined
values. Judith Shklar suggests that the difference between loyalty and
obligation is the rational code that defines political obligation. She writes,
“By obligation I mean rule-governed conduct, and political obligation
specifically refers to laws and lawlike demand, made by public agen-
cies” ~Shklar, 1993: 183!. On loyalty she writes, “What distinguishes loy-
alty is that it is deeply affective and not primarily rational.... If obligation
is rule driven, loyalty is motivated by the entire personality of an agent.
Political loyalty is evoked by nations, ethnic groups, churches, parties,
and by doctrines, causes, ideologies, or faiths that form and identify asso-
ciations” ~Shklar, 1993: 184!. In this explanation of loyalty, the missing
element is a legal structure that defines what one is expected to do or
not to do and that provides a rational basis for defining what a political
obligation is. Loyalty is, in this sense, even vaguer than political obliga-
tion since it relies not on theories of state or philosophies of law but on
moral expectations.
In Shklar’s terms, the problem of dual loyalty would be that one’s
loyal commitments infringe on one’s political obligations to the state. In
other words, that one’s emotional commitments conflict with one’s ratio-
nal and legal requirements as a citizen. Here the distinction between obli-
gation and loyalty is especially tricky, since not only is the term “dual
Abstract. Dual loyalty arises when a citizen or group of citizens holds political allegiance to
another state or entity which could challenge their loyalty to the state. What defines dual loy-
alty as an accusation is the assumption that it is impossible to hold multiple political loyalties,
but that, simultaneously, this multiplicity is denied any validity. This article explores the con-
cept, locating it historically and locating the false and often racist discourse that characterizes
its modern usage and meaning.
Résumé. La double loyauté survient quand un citoyen ou un groupe de citoyens donne son
allégeance à un autre État ou à une autre entité, ce qui pourrait mettre en cause sa loyauté
envers l’État. Ce qui confère à la double loyauté un caractère d’accusation, c’est la supposition
qu’il est impossible d’avoir plusieurs allégeances politiques, et que, simultanément, cette mul-
tiplicité d’allégeances n’a aucune validité. Le présent article explore ce concept, en le situant
sur le plan historique et en retraçant les discours faux et souvent racistes qui caractérisent son
emploi et son sens modernes.
loyalty” sometimes used in ways which do not fit this understanding, but
there are elements of political obligation that also do not fit. Indeed,
Shklar’s requirement that rationality plays a role in political obligation is
disputed by Hanna Pitkin ~1972! who challenges the idea that rationality
can explain political obligation. Moreover, the idea that loyalty is emo-
tional, in contrast to the rationality of political obligations, is difficult to
accept. The basis of any political obligation requires a judgment about
whether or not the obligating agent should have obligatory powers and
whether or not one wants to abide by obligations demanded. Obligation
involves the problem of choice, which involves the problem of agency,
which involves more than any rational calculus can provide. Emotion could
easily play a role in political obligation. Shklar’s definitions here are help-
ful but they are limited.
Consequently, I want to suggest a related but slightly different way
to frame the relationship between political obligation and ~political! loy-
alty. For the sake of analytical clarity, I will accept the argument that
binds political obligation to the state and to the law, but I want to sug-
gest that loyalty also contextualizes and can justify political obligations.
The judgments that one takes which make political obligation possible
involve an account of loyalty to the state and to the institutions of the
state. The strict divide between rational political obligations and possibly
irrational emotional loyalties does not work. Emotional ties will contrib-
ute toward justifying one’s political obligations and, as Pitkin suggests,
it is possible to be obliged for irrational reasons. For the problem of dual
loyalty to make terminological sense, loyalty can conflict with political
obligations to the state when there are normative judgments that chal-
lenge the reasons for one’s political loyalty to the state.
There is a reason for this framing of the problem of obligation and
loyalty. I am not aiming to provide an argument for political obligation
but a theory to analyze the problem of dual loyalty. In this regard, it is,
to my mind at least, necessary to recognize, first, that loyalty involves
normative claims and second, that political obligation is justified when
its normative basis can command the loyalty of the obliged. The problem
of dual loyalty arises when there is a tension between the first and the
second.
Dual Loyalty in Political Thought
At a minimum, dual loyalty functions as a descriptive term referring to
different and potentially competing loyalties, commitments and0or obli-
gations. In medieval political thought dual loyalty was a problem, but it
was also accepted as a basic feature of the body0soul duality that char-
acterizes human life. St. Augustine was particularly keen on this topic
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~Augustine, 1998, 2001!. He emphasizes that while the deeds that one
carries out are important, it is more important to ensure a pure soul and
thus achieve eternal salvation. Augustine takes it for granted that people
will face the dual loyalty between body and soul; the problem is in under-
standing how the duality functions in order to find eternal salvation.
Of course, the spiritual0temporal divide is not as clear as I am sug-
gesting. During his own time Augustine was faced with having to address
numerous cases where temporal rulers faced religious obstacles, reli-
gious leaders faced religious obstacles to their political goals, and lay
people were faced with the eternal tension between the desires of the
body and the needs of the soul that characterize a life of sin made pos-
sible by Adam and Eve’s folly. Moreover, and centuries later, the reli-
gious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries contributed to the
conditions under which dual loyalty could become a serious political prob-
lem. Yet, whereas previously dual loyalty was contextualized by a body0
soul dualism, these wars contributed to a modern account that framed
dual loyalty as a conflict between opposing political loyalties in the tem-
poral world. Insofar as loyalty to the state or its equivalent is concerned,
dual loyalty has been a consistent reality across history as rulers and reli-
gious leaders respectively tried to consolidate their authority and estab-
lish an order on the known world. However, whereas medieval Christian
thought framed it as a problem emerging out of humanity’s innate dual-
ity in a life of sin, modern thought frames it as a problem that leads to
instability and even war.
The religious wars that led to the Peace of Westphalia “were fought
around the question of political loyalty” and whether or not one can “be
loyal to the state when one is not following the religion of the state” ~van
der Veer, 2002: 96!. These wars demonstrated that religious loyalties could
come into violent conflict with temporal loyalties and obligations, thereby
suggesting that any kind of dual loyalty poses a serious problem to domes-
tic and international stability. The proposed solution was to concentrate
authority into a single locus of political sovereignty in each state. The
Peace of Augsburg ~1555! and of Westphalia ~1648! that ended these wars
and ushered in the modern state system established a system dedicated
to removing overlapping hierarchies and diversity from state founda-
tions, and institutionalizing a single locus of sovereignty in order to main-
tain order and prevent war. This “empire of uniformity ... established in
theory ... the premise that the sovereign people who establish the consti-
tution are already culturally indifferent members of one society who aim
to set up a regular constitutional association with a single locus of sov-
ereignty” ~Tully, 1995: 83!.
Behind this Westphalian system of uniformity was the fear that reli-
gious minorities would maintain a loyalty outside of the state where they
reside. The proposed solution was the principle of cujus regio ejus reli-
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gio ~like sovereign, like religion!. Consequently, “subjects either com-
plied with the established religion of the sovereign or migrated to another
jurisdiction where their religious beliefs prevailed” ~Preece, 2006: 142!.
While medieval political thought sought to reconcile the conflict between
body and soul, modern political thought wanted to eradicate any such
kind of conflict from politics and, for that matter, get rid of as much
diversity as possible from the state’s foundations.
Nevertheless, it remained acceptable up until the mid- to late 1800s
for individuals to shift their political loyalties across states. During this
time it was not uncommon to find nationals of one country serving in the
military of another, but this practice became considerably more treacher-
ous as the nation-state took over the normative conditions of political loy-
alty and political obligation.Yet, while the idea of the modern-nation state
is theoretically antithetical to nationals having justifiable yet opposing
political commitments or allegiances, dual loyalty would carry no sense
or weight as a term if it did not refer to a recognizable practice. In the mod-
ern era of the nation-state dual loyalty should, in theory, not exist. Con-
sequently and paradoxically, there is something especially modern about
the concept of dual loyalty, and “as Hobbes, and other political thinkers
realized, it was the nature of the state that was at issue here” ~van der Veer,
2002: 96!. The modern solution, as articulated by Hobbes ~1996! is that
state stability requires a unified allegiance to the sovereign, and the way
to achieve this common political obligation is with the social contract, out
of which many equal but at risk individuals become one commonwealth.
The movement toward uniformity made dual loyalty a serious prob-
lem, since it suggested a fragmentation of the foundations of the sover-
eign state. These foundations are based on the idea of a single locus of
political loyalty and tie this loyalty to state security. It seemed that if
people had multiple loyalties authority could not be ensured and insta-
bility ensued, both in relation to domestic control and international rela-
tions. Of course, the nation-state takes for granted the fidelity of its
citizens, but in the case of migrants this loyalty is questioned because of
the perception that migrants are susceptible to dual loyalty. What the Peace
of Westphalia termed a problem of religious faith modernity redefined
as an issue pertaining to the loyalty of migrant communities ~van der
Veer, 2002!. As David Miller writes, “The deeper question is how far
immigrant groups can be expected to make the nation-state they move to
their primary object of political allegiance. It is very common for mem-
bers of such groups to retain a strong emotional attachment to the coun-
try they have left and therefore to feel some loyalty to it.... But what
should we say when loyalties conflict?” ~Miller, 2008!. Miller argues that
citizenship is about mutual protection, and this normative goal should
determine the answer to such questions. It is important not to portray a
straw person here, but there is a notable history behind modern politics
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that premises state stability on a version of homogeneity that provide the
context to Miller’s questions and his answers.
The challenge for such theorists has been to sort out how difference
or pluralism can successfully find a place in the modern state which has
never really been homogenous in the first place ~Kymlicka, 1995; Kym-
licka and Norman, 2000!. In this debate the predicament of dual loyalty
poses a particularly disturbing problem because of the implication that
migrant and diasporic communities will retain ties to their homeland and
thus pose a threat to the perceived state homogeneity. In this modern
discourse dual loyalty becomes a threat to the state itself. This discourse
of dual loyalty is perhaps the most politically concerning since it relies
on a variety of foundational claims that dominate political thought and
modern political life and should not be taken for granted or accepted
uncritically.
In conclusion, dual loyalty as a problem has a paradoxical relation-
ship to the modern state system. Dual loyalty suggests that the state can-
not necessarily take for granted the unconditional allegiance of the nation
because the nation-state may actually be a group of nations with differ-
ent loyalties. The paradox is that by recognizing dual loyalty, either, for
example, as a challenge to state authority or as a possible reason for con-
scientious objection, the nation-state is accepting that it is not really a
nation-state but a nations-state or pluralist state when the idea behind
the modern nation-state is a rejection of this plurality. Thus the possibil-
ity of dual loyalty implies that the Westphalian solution has not resolved
one of the key problems that it was supposed to: the potential for discord
or violence because of multiple political allegiances.
Discourses of dual loyalty appear in a variety of guises. Sometimes
dual loyalty is perceived to function as a product of one’s ethnicity or
religion, and other times it may be purely ideological as was the case in
the United States during the communist witch hunts of the 1950s. Regard-
less of these different dual loyalty discourses, dual loyalty is inherently a
discourse related to a variety of security concerns: state security, national
security0integrity, the security of a minority group. Consequently, in the
following sections I provide various examples that illustrate how dual
loyalty functions as an accusation and how it is related to security dis-
courses. The examples suggest that dual loyalty is an inherently problem-
atic discourse, often linked to prejudice, discrimination, hierarchy and
sometimes oppression.
The Accusation
In Damascus in 1840 a Capuchin friar disappeared and a Jewish barber
was arrested and charged with the ritual murder of the friar. The barber
was tortured and after a forced confession a mob attacked the local Jew-
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ish community. The charge against this innocent Jewish barber revived
the blood libel accusation common in the Middle Ages ~Mendes-Flohr
and Reinharz, 1995!. The French government became involved, due to
its Middle Eastern ambitions, and supported the charges against the Jew-
ish barber. French Jews were, consequently, placed in a difficult posi-
tion. As French citizens they should support France’s ambitions in the
Middle East, but as Jews they could not stand behind their government’s
support of a malicious crime against Jews. In the end, due to the involve-
ment of a Jewish French politician, Adolphe Crémieux, the Jewish pris-
oners in Damascus were released. However, this victory was not without
consequences. “The outcome was an apparent victory in humanitarian
terms but... it was a Pyrrhic one. Thereafter, French patriots argued that
love of their brethren would always be greater than the love of the French
Jews for France” ~Cohen, 1996: 510!. At issue here was not the collec-
tive right of a group to protest, but the concern that a minority popula-
tion cares more about its own kin abroad than it does about the national
interests of their country of residence.
In this regard, and paradoxically, dual loyalty took on a potentially
insidious turn once it became framed by the modern ideal of universal
equality. The paradox of the Declaration of the Rights of Man ~1789!
was to simultaneously reject and emphasize human difference. This par-
adox is neatly summed up by Hannah Arendt who notes that, “The more
equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that
actually exist between people, and thus all the more unequal do individ-
uals and groups become” ~Arendt, 1986: 54!. In a system ostensibly built
on a premise of uniformity, pluralism can suggest a foundational threat
to the integrity of the nation and state.
Recognizing this paradox, minority populations sometimes over-
emphasize their loyalty and commitment to the majority in order to stave
off dual loyalty charges. Historically, minority populations have often tried
to demonstrate their loyalty to the state by participating in local customs
~Sarna, 1981!. The Jewish minority population in the newly formed United
States of America demonstrated precisely such a reaction:
President Washington himself had assured @the Jews# of “liberty of conscience
and immunities of citizenship.” All that America seemed to demand in return
was loyalty, devotion and obedience to law. Jews kept their side of the bargain.
They displayed their patriotism conspicuously, and diligently copied prevail-
ing Protestant standards of behaviour. In return, they won many new rights
and opportunities. Yet, they failed to receive hoped-for equality. Instead, pop-
ular anti-Jewish suspicions lived on, and reaction set in. Missionaries arose to
convert Jews, and succeeded in rekindling old hatreds. Many Americans, espe-
cially those affected by religious revivals ~“the Second Great Awakening”! and
anti-Enlightenment romantic currents, insisted anew that America was a “Chris-
tian country.” ~Sarna, 1981: 157!
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This account clearly places the Jewish minority at odds with the Chris-
tian majority due to the prejudices of the majority.2
However, while a majority may claim that the migrant community
needs to share in the values and participate in local customs in order to
demonstrate its inclusiveness, it is also up to the majority to decide when
a minority has done enough to satisfy the expectations of assimilation.
In this regard a minority population is always potentially suspect of not
fulfilling these expectations over assimilation and is thus always subject
to the possibility of a dual loyalty accusation. The Jews in America even-
tually overcame this prejudice, but it is noteworthy that Jean-Paul Sartre
recognized a similar logic at work in racist discourse ~Sartre, 1995!, and
this similarity provides one further characteristic of the modern account
of dual loyalty. It is undeniable that the charge of dual loyalty often func-
tions in large part in relation to racist discourse.
During the Second World War, Canadians and Americans of Japa-
nese ancestry were deemed suspicious and potentially dangerous to the
state. In 1941, the Canadian and American governments confiscated fish-
ing boats and property of residents and citizens of Japanese origin. These
policies accelerated after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7, 1941. Canadians and Americans of Japanese ancestry were required
to register with their respective government and by 1942 were being
interned in camps. In the United States the internment camps were not
closed until 1946, although it took until 1965 to resolve all legal com-
pensation claims. In Canada, it took until 1949 for Japanese-Canadians
to regain the right to travel freely inside the country, and it was not until
1988 that a formal apology and compensation were issued. These citi-
zens and residents were persecuted because of their ethnic origin, and it
was believed that somehow their ancestry meant that during a war against
the Japanese they would turn against their adoptive country and side with
the “homeland.” The liberal democracies of America and Canada acted
on the assumption that ethnic identity could pose a security threat because
of a potential for dual loyalty on the part of a minority population. It is
noteworthy that those of German and Italian descent were not subject to
the same treatment, thus further suggesting the inherent racism in this
case. The treatment of this visible minority may have been pure racism,
but it was dual loyalty concerns that provided the justification and secu-
rity basis for their internment and persecution. This example further illus-
trates the racist and international character that characterizes the dual
loyalty accusation.
The specter of dual loyalty often emerges out of the practices of
international relations and state foreign policy. In this vein, and writing
about contemporary American foreign policy, Yossi Shain notes that, “In
engaging in the politics of the country of origin ~home-country!, dias-
pora activists and organizations may become entangled in conflicting alle-
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giances. They must justify their actions in terms of American national
interests and values, answer to their US ethnic compatriots, and prove
their loyalty to their home country” ~1994–1995: 813!.
As an accusation, dual loyalty can originate not only in the state where
one resides but also from one’s country of origin ~Shain, 1994–1995!,
which can pose additional complications for diasporic groups. There are
a variety of ways that dual loyalty functions as an accusation. Conse-
quently, the modern accusation of dual loyalty can refer to racist ideol-
ogy or racial prejudices in society, the logic of the nation-state and its
security interests, and0or the practices of international politics that per-
tain to diasporic and migrant community relations to their kin or homeland.
This variety of dual loyalty discourse, nevertheless, relates to vari-
ous security issues, be it in regard to territorial integrity, national values,
foreign policy or national identity. For dual loyalty to make any kind of
sense ~however problematic or morally disturbing! it is to the extent that
there is a sense that security is based on a kind of homogenous patrio-
tism and national identity, where migrant communities, ethnic minori-
ties, or diasporic populations are faced with having to prove their loyalty
to the state. Consequently, dual loyalty is, I think, primarily an accusa-
tive phrase. While it should be obvious that people have many loyalties
during the course of their lives and these will most likely come into con-
flict at various points during their lives, insofar as loyalty to the state is
concerned, there is a severely limited tolerance for such conflicts express-
ing themselves in public life. The accusation of dual loyalty is primarily
framed as a security issue, although, as I will now argue, it forms a secu-
rity debate that is really more about racism than any actual security risk.
Dual Loyalty and Security
Dual loyalty can function as a security risk in at least two ways: first,
when the minority community fears the accusation of dual loyalty; sec-
ond, when the state or the majority perceive a minority to be guilty of
dual loyalty or posing a risk of dual loyalty. Briefly in the 1980s, Amer-
ican Jews were concerned about the dual loyalty threat arising in relation
to the espionage of Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew who was recruited
by Israel to spy on the United States. “This scandal was deeply embar-
rassing to American Jewry. It demonstrated on the part of some Israeli
officials a lack of sensitivity to the US-Israel relationship and to the sus-
ceptibility of US Jews to false charges of ‘dual loyalty’” ~Eizenstat, 1990–
1991: 97!. Many American Jews viewed him as a pariah and traitor to
his country.3 By this time there was little chance of the Jewish com-
munity’s falling under the accusatory shadow of dual loyalty, but the
embarrassment of the scandal arose because it provided a tangible case
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of perceived dual loyalty, something that Jews have historically been sen-
sitive to.
The second security discourse is based on the perception of a minor-
ity posing a security risk. It is irrelevant whether or not the minority
poses an actual security risk, since at issue is the perception of one.
Indeed, threats are always based on perception ~Jervis, 1976!, and ulti-
mately, if frustratingly, it may not make much difference if the threat is
“real” or “imagined” so long as it is perceived. It is the second security
discourse that is more troubling, since the possibility of a minority feel-
ing a looming shadow of dual loyalty accusations functions only to the
extent that a majority can make such an accusation with consequences to
follow. In this regard, dual loyalty discourse presumes that a minority
should be loyal to the state but then rejects this presumption or expecta-
tion of loyalty because of the simultaneously held belief that minorities
cannot be counted on in this way. In this aspect, dual loyalty is particu-
larly concerning, because it illustrates a condition whereby the minority
is made to suffer by the actions of a majority that refuses to recognize
the harassing and hierarchical nature of its actions. Consequently, by their
self-perception as a controlling majority they make it possible to per-
ceive the potential of a minority to become disloyal, subversive, and pos-
sibly even treasonous against the society they live in. As such, any
practices seen to be different from those of the majority could constitute
a potential indicator of dual loyalty. Consequently, the differences of
minority groups are easily construed to pose various kinds of security
risks. Multiple examples of this kind of discourse have prevailed in Brit-
ish debates over Muslim communities, new immigrants, and British values.
In relation to immigration and security, Sita Bali writes that, “Immi-
gration is... perceived to have an impact on a nation’s security. Immigrant
communities tend to maintain a strong connection with their home coun-
tries, and turbulence or instability in those societies can find expression
within the immigrant community as well, thereby bringing external prob-
lems into host societies” ~2001: 182!. The security dynamic at work here
is with how identity itself is perceived to pose security risks. Conse-
quently, the language used to address these perceived security threats
invariably refers to some of the key features identified by Albert Memmi
~2000! as racist, primarily discourses of xenophobia and thus exclusion
and prejudice due to perceptions of difference made possible by hierar-
chical relations. Indeed, “Any attempt to classify types of threats from
immigration quickly runs into distinctions between ‘real’ and ‘perceived’
threats, or into absurdly paranoid notions of threat or mass anxieties that
can best be described as xenophobic and racist” ~Weiner, 1992–1993: 104!.
Currently, the ostensible empirical reason for this fear is the “home-
grown” terrorist. The home-grown terrorist label is controversial. Its usage
is often connected to minority communities and thus suggests a mis-
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guided linkage to immigrants and often Muslims. Indeed, the Canadian
security pundit David Harris has specifically targeted Muslims as a threat
and questioned why security officials have refrained from referring to
Islam or Muslims as threats ~Frum, 2006!. To put this kind of rhetoric in
perspective, however, we should recall that the Oklahoma City bombing
in 1995, in which 168 people were killed and over 800 wounded, was
perpetuated by white supremacists, not Muslim terrorists as was initially
claimed ~Halliday, 2003!. Here was an instance of a home-grown terror-
ist attack, and the initial response was to claim that Muslims were behind
it, thereby suggesting that it is somehow easier to view visible minorities
to be threats.
So-called home-grown terrorists have appeared in Canada, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United States. In each case, the state
became concerned with how attached its residents were to constituencies
in distant countries, and, crucially, how these commitments involved a
fundamental and violent clash against the country in which they lived.
With echoes of an extreme form of alienation, these isolated cases have
contributed to a concern over the enemy within our midst, of minority
groups posing security risks, not just to the national value system and
national identity but to the state’s ability to control acts of violence inside
its borders. These cases suggest not so much examples of dual loyalty as
of extreme and violent antagonism toward one’s home state. Neverthe-
less, it is within the context of dual loyalty fears that such home-grown
threats are addressed.
It is in this context that Lord Goldsmith, the former attorney gen-
eral of England and Wales, proposed that upon graduation all students
should participate in a citizenship ceremony involving a pledge of alle-
giance to the Queen ~Goldsmith, 2007; “Pupils ‘To Take Allegiance
Oath,’” 2008; Ryan, 2008!. Furthermore, in his related report migration
is mentioned as an issue of concern for British values and security ~Gold-
smith, 2007!. Goldsmith also proposed a new national holiday to cel-
ebrate “Britishness,” similar to national days in Australia and Canada.
What is interesting about Goldsmith’s proposal is not that a Scottish rep-
resentative did not support the idea, but that it does not seem to be tied
to a founding moment of the United Kingdom but to a normative princi-
ple that involves confirming allegiance to the values and protection of
the state0nation. Goldsmith links the oath that students should take to
the one taken by newly naturalized citizens. However, other than xeno-
phobia and0or racism, whether there are empirical grounds for concern
for a weakening of “British values” and “British identity” due to popu-
lation diversity is questionable.
An examination of the last UK census, conducted in 2001, does not
support the claim that the UK is a multicultural society at risk of a demo-
graphic calamity threatening the majority’s identity. It found that 71.6
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per cent of England, Wales and Scotland remain Christian; 92.1 per cent
of the population is white; 5.2 per cent of the population classify them-
selves as members of religious minority groups comprised of 6 different
religions—the largest of these was Muslim at 2.7 per cent ~“Religion In
The UK.” 2001!—7.9 per cent of the population is made up of minority
ethnic groups ~“Population Size: Ethnicity.” 2001!; 45 per cent of the
minority ethnic population resides in London. The distribution of the UK’s
minority population is highly uneven, with the cumulative effect that the
rest of the UK has minorities but can hardly lay claim to being much of
a multicultural society outside of London. Indeed, the UK would have at
best an ambivalent and uncertain commitment to multicultural values
~Kymlicka, 2003!.
These data are not as recent as I would like and the next census may
have a different result. Nevertheless, taking the government’s data it is
odd that there is concern over the loyalty and political self-identification
of the general public when the minority is less than 10 per cent of the
population and just under half of the minority population resides in one
city—an empirical situation that I suspect has not changed much since
this data was produced. The fact that, according to the last census, Mus-
lims make up less than 3 per cent of the British public would indicate
that the threat of Muslims to the British nation is very low, if indeed
there even is such a threat. Nevertheless, due to domestic and inter-
national events, there are increasing concerns over linkages between iden-
tity, obligation and security. Goldsmith’s report was in response to a
concern over public loyalty and national identity, particularly in light of
the London bombings in July 2005 and an attack in 2007 at Glasgow
airport by so-called home-grown terrorists.
These attacks are terrifying but they do not suggest a threat to the
national identity or value system. Consequently, the danger must be one
of ideas about and perceptions of the possibility that citizens may find
loyalties to communities outside of the UK, thus posing a form of secu-
rity risk to the nation, and in the case of Muslims in the UK the dis-
course has been shown to be heavily racist ~Kyriakides et al., 2009!. It
can be difficult to get one’s head around the logic of this kind of security
discourse since the perceived threats are of generally law-abiding and
productive members of society who happen to belong to minorities. The
discourse functions as a security concern precisely because of the per-
ception that minority groups are not loyal enough to the host land, that
they share some of the common political obligations to the state ~they
obey the law, for example!, but they cannot be counted on to become
100 per cent committed residents ~whatever that would mean! due to loy-
alties they have to their non-Christian religion or homeland or kin abroad.
That government officials seem to be constantly claiming that Muslims
are not the target is, more than anything else, an indication that they are.
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These issues are often framed in terms of pluralism or multicultur-
alism, with dual loyalty referred to by euphemisms that suggest a path
toward national homogeneity. In the liberal vernacular, the problem of
dual loyalty is addressed in debates over cultural assimilation and minor-
ity rights. The multicultural0assimilation literature is often about the prob-
lem of dual loyalty, and this debate emerged in precisely dual loyalty
terms in officially multicultural Canada.
Multiculturalism as a policy was denounced for many of the same reasons
assimilationists have always raised against the maintenance of ethnicity. It would
breed “double consciousness”—loyalty to more than one country—it would
contribute to turning immigrant quarters into permanent ethnic ghettos; it would
slow the process of overcoming an ignorance of English and French that made
the immigrants exploitable in the past. ~Wilson, 1993: 626!
These issues have been raised again in response to the 17 Muslims in
Toronto who were arrested in June 2006 on charges of plotting to bomb
areas in and around Toronto. This debate has also taken place in the United
States and Europe, often in relation to the threat posed by terrorism.
The impact of terrorism inside the United States, Spain and Britain has led
both to a crisis in multiculturalism as a principle for organizing modern dem-
ocratic societies and to the fear that the old notion of “the enemy within” ~given
full rein in the Cold War, but in fact harking back via the European wars of
religion to the wooden horse of Troy! now applied to communities whose loy-
alty to a transnational religion might lead them into acts of violence against
their own fellow citizens. ~Aggestam and Hill, 2008: 106!
Since there are so few instances of minorities turning violent against
the majority, one would presume that such communities provide no real
threat to the state or nation. Yet, for many people too much cultural dif-
ference inside the state is a problem, and debates on these issues tend to
speak to an often imaginary but comfortable ideal of uniformity and famil-
iarity. It is difficult to find another reason why the debate in the UK over
the Archbishop of Canterbury’s remarks about Sharia law became so
heated. The issues contained in such debates were especially apparent in
a series of exchanges during the Presidential election over Barack Obama’s
faith. First, there was the suggestion that Obama was Muslim and that
this could jeopardize his commitment to the state ~Luttwak, 2008!. Sec-
ond, there was John McCain’s response that Obama is not a Muslim but
“a decent family man” ~Brown, 2008!. The correct answer, as Colin Pow-
ell stated when he endorsed Obama, should have been, what does it mat-
ter if he is Muslim ~Johnson, 2008!?
Powell was right, and these debates are odd. It should not be taken
for granted that dual loyalty has to be a problem and that minorities are
threats. Surely the state is strong enough to manage the possibility of
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some of its citizens being in difficult moral dilemmas about where to
place their political loyalty. Indeed, the fact that such identity conflicts
have rarely weakened the state is an indication of how this problem
is primarily over normative assumptions and not state stability. As
Anthony D. Smith argues,
Conflicts between loyalty to a national state and solidarity with an ethnic
community, within or outside the boundaries of that state, may lead to accu-
sations of “dual loyalties,” and families may find themselves torn between
the claims of competing communities and identities. There is in fact always
the potential for such identity conflicts. That they occur less often than one
might expect is the result of a certain fluidity in all processes of individual
identification. ~1992: 59!
The problem of dual loyalty should not be a great problem since individ-
ual identification is fluid, and often individuals and groups can sort out
the moral challenge of dual loyalty without its becoming too serious a
problem or challenge to state solidarity. Nevertheless, it would appear
that the fear of dual loyalty is real and that in the short term, at least, it is
easy for significant segments of the majority population to turn to easy
but false generalizations, often racist, that contextualize the accusation
of dual loyalty.
However, could dual loyalty function simply as a descriptive term
and not as an ominous accusation? I am unconvinced that dual loyalty
can disassociate itself from the perception that the state demands uncon-
ditional loyalty and any moral obligations that challenge this loyalty are
a challenge to the state. Nevertheless, assuming for a moment that it is
possible to recognize the term to have a purely descriptive usage, dual
loyalty might simply be a basic feature of modern life. For example, in
the wake of Kosovo declaring its independence from Serbia on February
17, 2008, the Serbian diaspora reacted by condemning the independence
declaration. In Canada, there were protests by Serbian-Canadians in Van-
couver, Edmonton, Calgary, Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa. At the Toronto
rally, protestors condemned the American government’s recognition of
Kosovo as an independent state and demanded that the Canadian govern-
ment not recognize Kosovo. The protestors suggested that recognizing
Kosovo would be against international law, but also that “it could have
ramifications on this country’s unity” ~Thomas, 2008!. Drawing a con-
nection with Quebec separatists, the Serbian-Canadian protestors held
placards stating “KosovoQuebec.” In this instance, the protestors sug-
gested that as good Canadians they could not support Kosovo’s indepen-
dence. There is no dual loyalty here since what exists is simply a minority
constituency stating a political argument. Indeed, I am not sure that dual
loyalty as a descriptive concept carries much weight—people always have
multiple loyalties. The term’s power is in its discriminatory implications.
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It is obviously true that people will have multiple and overlapping
loyalties that may come into conflict at some point during their lives. Con-
sequently, it may be worth asking why dual loyalty is treated as anything
other than the usual conflict of commitments that characterize politics.
Dual loyalty is clearly a problem about commitment, and commitment is,
as Judith Shklar points out, a complex concept that relates to politics, law,
philosophy and morality. However, as Socrates suggested, being a good
citizen involves uncovering hidden contradictions, and consequently, it
makes little sense to presume that political life and moral values will not
come into contradiction at some point ~Arendt, 2005!.
Conclusion
Immigrant communities are particularly vulnerable to accusations of dual
loyalty, since they are often perceived to
destroy the isomorphism between people, sovereign and citizenry. Immigrants
are perceived as foreigners to the community of shared loyalty towards the
state and shared rights guaranteed by the state. Trans-national migrants pre-
sumably remain loyal to another state whose citizens they are and to whose
sovereign they belong, as long as they are not absorbed into the national body
through assimilation and naturalization. ~Wimmer and Schiller, 2002: 309!
Yet no state is homogenous and there are always minority populations.
To presume that an absence of minorities is a prerequisite to stability
and unity is empirically unfounded and morally questionable. Further-
more, it is mistaken to think that only minorities will be susceptible to
dual loyalty. Having a shared history does not mean that a population
will join together and stay together, regardless of whether they are a minor-
ity ~Clifford, 1994!. Why a minority cannot be counted on but a member
of the majority can is blatantly fallacious. Everyone is susceptible to a
crisis of conscience, or a difficult decision to face. Moral quandaries are
the stuff of human existence.
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the modern project of the
nation-state with its idea of a homogenous population may serve to dic-
tate much contemporary political discourse, but it is also contingent on a
specific political project. However, this project and the “discovery” of
the uniform nation-state at Westphalia were fictions and were known to
be so at the time.
This was a fiction of the early modern theorists, as Hugo Grotius exposed in
his survey of the diversity of existing constitutions, designed to ensure in theory
the consolidation of early modern states that they wished to promote in prac-
tice. Leibniz replied to Hobbes and Pufendorf in 1677 that no known political
society exhibited the cultural and institutional uniformity that they took for
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granted.... But these voices, barely heard today, were drowned out by the ascen-
dancy of uniformity. ~Tully, 1995: 83!
In other words, the suggestion that uniformity is necessary for state sta-
bility was an argument rendered for political purposes and which suc-
ceeded due to an assumption that diversity was a cause of war.
While this kind of logic suggests that dual loyalty is a serious prob-
lem, it does not have to be. Some historical perspective might be in order
here. For example, during the presidential election, John F. Kennedy suc-
ceeded in overcoming the perception that being a Catholic might mean
that his loyalty to the United States would be in tension with his loyalty
to the Vatican. Moreover, many countries allow their citizens to carry dual
citizenship. Indeed, since the latter half of the twentieth century it has
become increasingly common for states to allow dual citizenship.4 The
dual citizenship phenomenon most likely is allowed since the state does
not consider it to threaten the state’s ability to demand the loyalty of its
citizens. Moreover, the chance of an individual being a citizen of two coun-
tries that are at war with each other is low, although the chance of their
having foreign policy conflicts is high. Often, such conflicts will matter
little. Dual citizens of the UK and Canada, for example, probably will not
find themselves morally torn because of debates in economic trade talks
and any such differences would hardly be referred as a case of dual loyalty.
Dual loyalty functions as a political term when it is tied to discrim-
ination, fear, and often racism, such as when liberal societies start accus-
ing minorities of having dual loyalties. Often those accused will be
targeted because they do not conform in some way to whatever the nation
is presumed to be. Yet dual and indeed multiple loyalties are quite com-
mon and they rarely pose much of a threat. Many of us have multiple
political loyalties that come into conflict. That this kind of discourse
becomes a discriminatory accusative one is dubious. What is required in
response to such accusations is a deeper engagement with our inherent
pluralism, to what Fred Halliday refers to here as internationalist:
The internationalist tradition may have chalked up many illusions; most polit-
ical traditions do. But, faced as we are with the complacency of national pride
and the automatic loyalty claimed by the nation-state, the ever-recurrent waves
of nationalism and the grip of institutions associated with it, an element of
internationalist intransigence, intellectual and moral, may well be in order.
~1988: 198!
There are many normative challenges involved in the dual loyalty
discourse, challenges that are not by themselves new, but are surely worth
reflecting upon seriously, as religion, immigration and diaspora relations
become increasingly important for modern politics and international rela-
tions. Contemporary politics should be based on discourses that recog-
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nize pluralism to be a fait accompli, to recognize change and for migrants
and hosts to respect the diversity of populations. This is easier said than
done, but I suggest that future debates and government policies relating
to identity, security and the insidious nature of the dual loyalty discourse
take into account that homogeneity is not a security solution, and dual,
and indeed multiple, loyalties are the norm. It may even be possible for
minority groups who view each with suspicion to at least empathize with
each other’s experience as minorities.
Notes
1 The literature on political obligation is vast, but two good advanced introductions
are, Klosko, 2005; Simmons, 1980.
2 It is worth pointing out here that while it is common to view the United States as a
Christian country, the United States Constitution does not privilege any religion and
states that all established religions shall be respected. As it is written in the First
Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
3 In an interview with David Twersky, current Senior Advisor to the Executive Direc-
tor for Policy, International Affairs and Communication at the American Jewish Con-
gress, Twersky mentions how at the time there was some anxiety about the Pollard
Affair becoming a dual loyalty issue. The issue of dual loyalty, however, emerged
primarily in debates within Jewish communities, and of whether or not to get involved
either on behalf of Pollard or against him. He recalls heated debate at the time on
having loyalties to both Israel and the United States, but in the end the general deci-
sion was not to get involved. Interview conducted by the author in New York City,
September 2, 2008.
4 This change may provide an indication that the modern-nation state is coming to
terms with the inherent diversity of its population, although it does not demonstrate
that states are less concerned about dual loyalty problems. It is telling that it is often
illegal for anyone of dual citizenship to enter into a country in which they are a
citizen using their other passport.
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